THE CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF TORT LAW*
Abstract
The Institutes of Justinian and other Greco-Roman recitations of tort-type delicts
and remedies are recognized as root stock of modern western tort law, common law or
civil code-based alike. Long before these sources, however, both ancient and primitive
cultures adopted norms and customs which defined permissible individual and group
conduct, and which provided for remedies ranging from money damages to banishment.
Among the surveyed examples of ancient cultural responses to tort-type delicts
were numerous instances in which both the civil wrong identified and the remedy
provided for can be harmonized readily with modern tort law, whether it is practiced in
common law or civil code nations or throughout the world. A broad range of such
examples can be found not only in the nations or regions in which such norms obtained,
but also in their specific subject areas: pubic nuisance, manslaughter, assault, trespass,
conversion, negligence, strict liability, deceit, defamation, and even invasion of privacy.
Indeed, a review of ancient tort-type law dispels any Euro-centric claim that western
Europeans led in the conception and nurturance of tort principles at any point in history.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Years without number before the coalescence of human groupings into civil
society, kinship groups, and later tribes and cultures, needed norms by which individual
conduct could be ordered. The primary stimulus for such norm was group survival, and
the ancillary motivations were the achievement of civil peace and the protection of one’s
person and property from wrongful harm. The means by which normative behavioral
impositions operated took countless shapes, but the as a general proposition could be

classified, in roughly chronological order, as spiritualism, folk tales, folk law, mythology,
religion and customary law.1
The application of such sources as justification for modern civil decision has
largely disappeared, although perhaps not entirely. An electronic search within state and
federal legislative data bases for “I cannot tell a lie” or “Horatio Alger” would surely
reveal a cluster of allusions, and the cylclical debate over religion in public affairs
without more betrays the tenacity of religion’s influence on our public life. Withal, even
though the sources of contemporary civil law have changes, the needs of the needs of
modern society for a similar order and predictability in human civil affairs has not
changed very much from the needs confronting our ancestors. It is therefore unsurprising
that ancient examples of normative beliefs, practices, and customary law reveal sprawling
similarities with modern tort law.
At the core of tort norms, and later tort law, has always been a group desire that
disputes be resolves without retaliation and escalation. This rationale receives an early
expression from the Greek observer Demosthenes, in the speech Against Konon, as it
might pertain to remedies for battery and abuse: “[In] cases of battery . . .; these, I am
told, exist in order that no one, when losing, should defend himself with a stone or
anything of that sort, but he should await the legal case. . . . The most trivial offence, I
suppose, that of abuse, has been provided for to [ensure] that homicide should not be
committed, . . . but [that] there should be a legal case for each of these, and they should
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For the purposes of this article, the terms “ancient” and “primitive” are distinguished in this way:
“Ancient” is a designation that the example existed in antiquity. “Primitive” connotes that the example can
be identified or hypothesized as existing in preliterate society.

not be decided by the individual’s anger or whim.”2 Islamic law is also clear cut in its
differentiation between excusable self-defense and culpable retaliation.3
At the same time, it would be disingenuous to deny that dissimilarities between
ancient and modern approaches to civil justice are not likewise apparent at almost every
turn to this inquiry. Some primitive remedies for conversion might offer not only
restitution to the wronged party but also the opportunity to exact a fine, to be collected by
the complainant himself, a double recovery by today’s standards. Other pairings of right
and remedy might at first suggest of the modern action in public nuisance, but upon
evaluation be seen to depart from that rule in the designation of who may bring the claim.
And a very large number of disputes are resolved not by fact-finding, application of
governing norms, and an ajudicatory declaration, but rather by mediation and
conciliation, which although a goal in numerous state and federal precincts cannot be
described as a general rule.
As suggested, over the ages the nature of offenses that have stimulated
identification as redressable wrongs has become mostly settled. The designations of the
subsections in Part II to this research largely comprise them: (1) public and private
nuisance and disturbing the peace; (2) unintentional killing; (3) assault and battery; (4)
trespass to land and chattels; (5) conversion; (6) negligence; (7) strict liability; (8) deceit
and false report; (9) defamation and false witness; and, in some cultures, (10) in some
cultures, covetousness and hoarding.
Describing with confidence the range of remedies for such wrongs, much less
their varied justifications, is a more difficult task. Or at least it seems so due to the
2
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diverse ways tort objectives are described – often in terminology that seems not so much
a dispassionate description than an argument for a polemical position. Among the more
interesting groupings of tort objectives can be found in a source one would not at first
think of: Friedrich Nietsche. In his GENEALOGY OF MORALS Nietsche identifies a core
cluster of the objectives of punishment.4 Winnowed of punishments suited to criminal
actions, one is left with more classically civil, or only quasi-criminal, responses, i.e., the
types of remedies associated with torts. To Nietsche, these include: “. . . (2) Punishment
consisting of the payment of damages to the injured party, including affect
compensation[;]5 (4) Punishment as a means of isolation of a disequilibrating agent, in
order to keep the disturbance from spreading further. . . .[;]6 (8) Punishment as a means
of creating memory, either for the one who suffers it – so-called `improvement’ – or for
the witnesses[;] (9) Punishment as the payment of a fee, exacted by the authority which
protects the evil-doer from the excesses of vengeance[; and (10)] Punishment as a
compromise with the tradition of vendetta . . . . [.]7
A question central to this article can be framed in this way: When it comes to tort
law, can it be said that “It has always been thus?”

Henry Sumner Maine observed:

Now the penal Law of ancient communities is not the law of Crimes; it is the law of
Wrongs, or, to use the English technical word, of Torts. The person injured proceeds
against the wrong-doer by an ordinary civil action, and recovers compensation in the
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shape of money-damages if he succeeds. . . . [All such Torts] gave rise to an Obligation
or vinculum juris, and were all requited by a payment of money. 8 It is noteworthy that
primitive and ancient law contain numerous examples in which the society has seemingly
concluded that simple corrective justice is insufficient to the objective of the joint
objectives of redressing the harm done and also deterring the actor and others. For
example, throughout the Tibetan Rules for Punishment, the burden imposed by the
restitutionary interest of the rule, i.e., the return of the animal, and elsewhere the
property, etc., is seemingly ancillary to), the punishment dimension of the rule. It might
be surmised that over time the collective wisdom was that simple restorative justice had
an insufficient gravitas as a deterrent if unaccompanied by a fine payable to the wronged
party.9 In cases of incorrigibility, though, the penalty might be shunning or even banning
from the community.10
I have suggested that as a general proposition, spiritualism, folk tales, folk law,
mythology, religion and customary law underlay ancient law. The import of spiritualism
and its more formal successor, religion, is self revealing. So too mythology with its gods,
demigods, pantheism and anthropomorphism.
Customary law is sometimes called the “living law” and has reflected rules to
which a particular society has assigned epochal steadfast adherence, rules that a culture
8
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has followed so unflaggingly and consistently as to permit the application of no
inconsistent rule. To Sir John Salmond, customary law embraces “any rule of action
which is actually observed by men – any rule which is the expression of some actual
uniformity of voluntary action”, irrespective of whether it is obligatory and enforceable
or exists by reason of de facto observance.11
What of ancient codes, such as the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi? Ordinarily
early codes reflected efforts to gather, rationalize and organize already extant customary
law. For all that is apparent, Hammurabi himself intended that his law reconcile wrongs
and bring justice to those aggrieved. His unmistakable goal was the economic stability
and enhancement of the people.12 By way of further example, the “Rules of Punishment
for Tibetans (1733)”, published by the Manchu Imperial Court, have been interpreted as
“an attempt to standardize . . . folk law by removing authority from the local chieftans
and monasteries.”13

It is not surprising that such antecedents of customary law include

folk law, folk custom and folk tale.
In the many examples of primitive and ancient law to follow, it is seen that the
norms of conduct, be they characterized as folk law or custom or otherwise, were
enforced not by any leadership of the community but rather by the whole. Sometimes in
literate societies, and invariably in preliterate ones, folk laws and customs, as well as folk
tales, were dispersed and preserved orally, which has been described as a tradition that
“represents the complete information deemed essential, retained and codified by a
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society, primarily in oral form, in order to facilitate its memorization and ensure its
dissemination to present and future generations.”14
Of great significance too was the cultural watershed of symboling. Man’s capacity
for symbolic communication accelerated the development of norms, and the
characteristic of all such norms was that they confined the realm of permissible
behaviors. The higher level functioning of man was more than a boon to man, it was an
absolute essential to survival.15 Without symboling the communication of norms could
only survive in a state of enduring retardation, and without norms human life would fall
into chaos. As put by Langer, “[M]an can adapt himself to anything his imagination can
cope with; but he cannot deal with chaos.”16
Early man needed norms and proscriptions to permit his very survival, and this
need preceded kings, and thus the premium on keeping the “King’s peace”, and even
large human groupings that could be described as units of the earliest proto civilizations,
Early man needed norms and proscriptions to permit his very survival. These norms and
proscriptions have been described loosely as “natural law”, and the form the foundation
of all modern law. Hobbes placed the source of natural law as “reason”, writing in
LEVIATHAN: “Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace upon which men may be
drawn to agreement. These Articles are they which otherwise are called the Laws of
Nature”.17 T.E. Holland describes the rights conferred by natural law as these: “I. To
personal safety and freedom[;] II. To society and control of one’s family and
14
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dependants[;] III. To reputation[;] IV. To advantages open to the community generally;
such as free exercise of one’s calling[;] V. To possession and ownership [; and ] To
immunity from damage from fraud.”18 The discussion to follow in the next section of
this article will validate Hobbes’ recitation in that it will show that the norms and
customs to which man turned his attention from the earliest times bear a similarity –
regular if not perfect - to the natural law described by later theorists.

II.

PARTICULAR APPLICATIONS OF ANCIENT TORT LAW
A. Nuisance and Disturbing the Peace

Throughout primitive and ancient law are examples of strictures suggesting that
the social group placed a greater premium on restoring order and good will than it did on
determining that one disputant was right and the other wrong. In Australian aboriginal
customary law, for example, the objective or resolution of a dispute would more often be
the quieting of temper and the restoration of a placid community than it would be any
strict identification of which party was at fault.19
Tibetan folk law demonstrates numerous examples of strictures against what
today might be termed “public nuisance.” In the Rules of Punishment for Tibetans
(1733), Rule No. 26, titled “Making Fire to Burn Wild Animals Out of Their Lairs”, vests
in the individual who discovers the infraction the remedy of fining the hunter “one
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`nine’”. Reposing the remedy in the person discovering the delict might at first seem like
an example of the “special injury” rule in public nuisance, in that an individual may bring
the claim. Yet in this “Fire” rule there is no articulated need that the reporting
individual/claimant have suffered any injury at all. Perhaps the rule simply stands as an
example of a public nuisance proceeding that can be brought not only by public officials
but also by individuals, with the inclusion of individuals seen as a prudential device to
increase deterrence by increasing detection.
Penalty provisions referencing one or more “nine” or one or more “animals” were
enforceable with reference to Rule No. 39, which detailed how’ these terms correlated
with livestock: Rule No. 39 details how the terms “1 nine” or a “Five Animals” correlate
with livestock: “One `nine’ means a combination of nine animals such as 2 horses, 2 dso,
2 three-year-old cow 1 two-year old cow. `Five animals’ means 1 dso, 1 cow, 1 threeyear old cow, and 2 two-year old cows. The person who comes to demand these fines is
entitled to receive as his fee 1 three-year old cow from the guilty. In places where horses
are plentiful dso may be offered in their stead.”20
Among the Pygmies living in the Ituri Forest of the former Congo, there has long
been a saying that “a noisy camp is a hungry camp.”21 This is so because the Pygmies
are hunters, and as is self-evident, unnecessary noise drives the game deeper into the
forest. As it might be today, and yet for different reasons, unreasonable noise is therefore
treated as a nuisance. Anthropologist Colin Turnbull records and incident in which the
father of an attractive village girl chased away a suitor and persisted in his tirade by
taking apposition in the middle of the village calling for others to support him, and that
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failing, took to rattling the roofs of the surrounding huts. An elder interceded in a calm
voice: “You are making too much noise – you are killing the forest, you are killing the
hunt.It is for us older men to sleep at night and not to worry about the youngsters. They
know what to do and what not to do.”22 Evidently displeased, the father nevertheless
accepted the resolution.
Under Roman Law, the Institutes of Justinian included rules that reveal numerous
strictures against the imposition of one’s will over the rights of a neighbor, and strong
deterrents for the disregard thereof. Specifically as to urban estates, is Book III, Title II
par. 2, as interpreted by Gaius, to which Ulpianus, there was a prohibition on the
obstruction of a neighbor’s view.23 In one notable example, pertaining to what would
today be called the law of private nuisance or trespass, another provision goes so far as to
detail a preference that adjoining landowners bargain in advance for agreement as to
contemporaneous uses of land that might trigger dispute. In Book III par. 4, the Institutes
provide that one “wishing to create” such a right of usage “should do so by pacts and
stipulations.” A testator of land may impose such agreements reached upon his heirs,
including limitations upon building height, obstruction of light, or introduction of a beam
into a common wall, or the construction of a catch for a cistern, an easement of passage,
or a right of way to water.24 These last two examples reflect a clear preference for ex
ante bargaining over economically wastefulex post dispute resolution. The provision
permitting the testator to bind his heirs to any such agreement is additionally efficient in a
manner akin to the approach that was taken later and famously by Justice Bergen in the
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cement plant nuisance case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc.,25 ensured that its
award of damages would be indeed a one-time resolution of the dispute by requiring that
the disposition of the claim be entered and recorded as a permanent servitude on the land.

B. Manslaughter or Wrongful Death
At Sura 4 the Koran prohibits, unsurprisingly, the intentional killing of a believer.
In traditional Islamic law the unintended killing of another would warrant payment of a
full diyet, or blood money, set at 3.8 grams of silver.26

Should a believer be killed by

“mischance”, i.e., accident, the responsible party “shall be bound to free a believer from
slavery; and the blood money shall be paid to the family of the slain, unless they convert
it into alms.”27 Killing in self-defense would be unpunished. Lawrence Rosen explained
the distinction with the example of one Zeyd, who attacked Amr. Reviewed by the mufti,
it was noted that Amr could have rescued himself by calling for help, thus denying him
the privilege of self-defense.28
There are numerous Eastern examples of the treatment of unintentional killing as
an offense redressable in money or other damages. In ancient India, if a person were
accidentally killed by an animal-drawn vehicle, the driver would be subjected to “the
same liability as a thief [.]”29

In China, for injuries resulting in death, traditional law

distinguished between intentional killing and accidental killing. T’ang Code Article 339
provided that “All cases of accidentally (kuo shih) killing or injuring someone follow the
25
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manner in which the death occurs and treat as redeemable.”30 By “redeemable” is meant
that the offense may be expiated by the payment of money to the victim’s family. The
analogous provision in the Ch’ing Code describes accidental killing (wu sha) in the
context of hunting for game (his sha). It states that for an accidental killing the
punishment should be the same as for a killing in a fight, except that “redemption is
permitted”. The Ch’ing Code gives such examples as an accidental death “where one is
shooting wild animals or for some reason is throwing bricks or tiles”; “climbing and
one’s fall causes others to fall; navigating a boat by sail, riding a horse that becomes
frightened, driving a cart downhill, or lifting an object when “one lacks the strength to
sustain it and someone else is harmed[.” In each such instance, when “there has been no
intention to harm”, the Code provides that “the sentence is to conform with the
punishment for killing or injuring in a fight”, but redemption is permitted, with “the
money to be given to the family of the person killed or as a contribution to funeral or
medical expenses.”31

C.

Assault and Battery

It is an historical verity that intentional battery is an offense that creates a high
risk of retaliation, or self help, an yet some Native American groups even made
allowance for it, while at the same time providing for the intercession of village council.32
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Other Indian groups, in contrast, demonstrate “a general disapproval of `retaliation as a
means of obtaining justice’”.33
Putting aside its punishment of death for one who strikes his mother or father,34
under the Torah one who inflicts a direct nonmortal blow to another will not be liable if
the victim is able to get up and about, “even with a stick”, providing an interesting early
invocation of the principle de minimis non curat lex. If, however, the injury is
sufficiently serious that the victim is temporarily incapacitated, the aggressor “must
compensate him . . . for his enforced inactivity, and care for him until he is completely
cured”.35 This approach contemplates not only recovery for economic loss
(compensation for “enforced inactivity”), and also rehabilitation expenses.
In Islamic law, compensatory justice for injurious battery might provide for
damages according to a schedule keyed to the severity of the harm, rather as might
modern workers compensation. Liability might be according to diyet, or blood money.36
Full blood money due for the unintentional death of the victim was set at 10,000 dirham,
or 3.8 grams of silver.37 Serious injury to the hand, the leg or the eye was compensable
with half blood money. Loss of a tooth might warrant 1/20 blood money.38
The Koran is not pacifistic by any means, and does not feign to offer by its rules
remedies to persons that may avoid injury by resort to self-help, or by means of
retaliation. While the Koran explains that God does not countenance attacking others
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first, Muslims may fight for the cause of God against those who fight you [.]”39 Is it then
paradoxical that it may be true that, as some scholars claim, “that the function of law in
Islam is merely to get people back on the negotiating track.”40 This perception pertains
instead to a goal that the state attend to affairs of government, not religion, and that Islam
attends to religion, and not to the state, and that it is in these subject matters that the
“negotiating” ideal obtains.41 Within the tribal customary law of the Awlad Ali of Egypt,
for battery resulting in injury diyah, or blood money, would be paid to the family of the
victim, together with kebara, calculated in money and animals.42
Under The Rules of Punishment for Tibetans, battery could incur variable fines
depending upon the severity of injury. A fine of three “nines” would be levied for a fight
resulting in an injury to the eye, hand, or foot, although if the injury was such as could be
cured, the fine was one “nine”, as was true also for a fight causing the loss of teeth, or an
abortion (one “nine”). When hair would be torn off, the fine was five animals. 43
In ancient Indian law, the “low born” were treated very differentially than were
the Brahmins. For injurious assaults against one of a superior caste, punishment ranged
from amputation of the limb injured by the assailant, banishment or exile, or for spitting
on one’s superior, the cutting off of the assailant’s lips.44 Other aggression causing injury
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and pain to another (or to an animal) called for the king to “impose a punishment
proportionate to the severity of the pain.”45
Lastly, pursuant to Greek law, striking another gave rise to a private cause of
action in battery (dike aikeias). If liability would be found, it would ordinarily be against
the one striking the first blow. The penalty would be an amount payable in money
damages as assessed by a jury.46

D.

Trespass to Land and Chattels

In the authoritative and ancient work Manu, entitled alternatively “The Law Code
of Manu” or “Manava Dharmasastra”, the text references ancient Indian law governing
the trespass of animals. For such fields surrounding a settlement as are left open, any
farm animal damage to crops should not be punished. To receive any protection for one’s
fields, a person “should erect a fence over which a camel cannot look and cover any hole
through which a dog or pig could poke his head.”47 For damage caused by herded
livestock to such fenced land, a fine of 100 should be imposed – and if the livestock are
unherded, they should be impounded. For livestock damage to other fields, “one and a
half Panas should be assessed for each animal”, and the owner of the land should be
compensated for any crop loss.48
Prior to the laws of Hammurabi49 there were published the laws of King Ur-Nami
and Lipit-Ishtar. Read together as principal sources of the law of ancient Babylonia,
there is seen an emphasis on the protection of person, property and commerce from
45
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forced divestiture of a right or a prerogative. Regarding navigation, a collision between
two boats on a body of water having a perceptible upstream and downstream would
trigger a presumption of fault on the part of the upstream captain, on the logic – faulty or
not --- that the upstream captain had a greater opportunity to reduce avoidable accidents
than did his counterpart, as the former would be traveling at a slower speed.50
Anglo-American common law trespass can includes numerous instances in which
a landowner is held liable in trespass if a structure or an activity on the first individual’s
property causes damages, by diversion of water or otherwise, to the land of another. In
Athenian law is found the account of Against Kallikle, recorded by Demosthenes, in
which it appears that Kallike and a neighbor both lived on a hillside.

Kallikes

constructed a wall to protect his land from water runoff from rainfall, which wall served
this purpose, but also diverted water onto his neighbor’s property. For this trespass,
Kallikes was fined in damages (kike blabes) a sum of 1000 drachmas.51
In ancient Athens, an action for destruction of or damage to chattels was defined
in a way as to seeming merge the modern notions of trespass to chattels and conversion.
An action for “damage” could be brought for any “physical damage to a piece of
property, such as to destroy it or make it useless or less valuable than before, but without
taking it away [.]”52
Tibetan folk law includes methods of economic recovery, recovery in kind, and
punitive consequences that bespeak strong deterrence objectives. Should trespassing
50
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cattle damage one’s field, the owner of the cattle may appropriately seize the cattle
pending payment for the damage. Should the land at issue be not a field but instead a
pasture utilized by nomads for the grazing of their animals, Tibetan folk law proscribes
the trespassing of one nomadic tribe’s cattle on the pasture of another tribe. Again the
trespassing cattle may be seized pending payment for the harm done. Should the grazing
be done in the course of a caravan’s passage through the territory of another tribe, a
pristinely market-based transaction is expected. The traveling tribe offers to the local
tribal chieftain a gift of “grass money”, to compensate for the grass the herd is expected
to graze.
The 1733 Rules of Punishment for Tibetans published by the Manchu Imperial
Court contains provision for trespass to or conversion of another’s animals. Pursuant to
Rule No. 30, “Injury to Other People’s Animals”, provides that should the animal of
another be killed, the perpetrator is fined one “nine”, and also must pay the full value of
the animal to the owner. If a horse is shot and killed, two horses must be given in
compensation. If the horse is only injured, a fine of a two-year old cow is levied.53
In ancient India, should a cart or coach kill a large animal (such as a cow or an
elephant) its owner (if the driver was unskilled) would be fined half the amount that
would be applicable if the offense had been theft. For the similar death of a small farm
animal, the fine would be 200; for a “beautiful animal” such as a bird, the fine would be
50, and for a donkey, a sheep or a goat, 1 Masa.54
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In our time, we can refer to the children’s expression “Cross my heart, hope to
die” as an affirmation of the community’s disproval of deceit.55 The proscription of
trespass to chattels or conversion, the occurrence of which has always been common to
the playground, remains imbedded in several children’s’ rhymes that indicate the
strongest community aversion to any initiative by a giver of goods to engage in self help
to regain possession.56 One such folk proscription is found in a French children’s rhyme,
reduced in writing as “Once given away, stays given; taking away is stealing.”57 More
severe consequences are opportuned in a saying attributed to Dutch, Flemish, German
and French children, to this effect: “Once given, taken away, go to Hell three times.”58
During the Egyptian Sixth Dynasty, from approximately 2460 to 2200 B.C., the
law bled together the notions of theft as a criminal action as opposed to conversion, to be
prosecuted by a civil complainant. During the reign of Pepi I, c. 2325, there was
appointed a prosecutor named Weni, who presided over these and other matters, and
whose recitations of the matters brought before him gives evidence of the law employed
and the remedies exacted.59 In one such suit Weni recounts being sent by the king “to
prevent [the army] from taking bread or sandals from a wayfarer, to prevent any one of
them from taking a loin-cloth from any village, to prevent any one of them from taking
any goat from any people.”60

Upon a finding of responsibility, the remedy exacted

would typically be that of requiring the thief to return any stolen goods to the victim, and
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also to pay the victim damages in the amount of a multiple, often two to three times, the
value of the property asported.61
In ancient Greece there was followed an approach consistent with that of so-called
“civilized” societies and pre-literate societies alike throughout the world. That approach
was a two-pronged response to conversion of chattels. First, the wrongdoer must give up
the wrongfully gained property. Second, the perpetrator should be punished. Following
successful prosecution of a claim for theft (dike klopes) The punishment might be the
payment of a fine gauged at twice the value of the property. In egregious instances, an
additional penalty of time in public stocks.62
For some theft the remedy would be restitution in some fixed amount, or in a
multiple of the value of what was stolen. The same would be required of any knowing
receiver of any such stolen goods.63 Among Indian indigenous groups, cash fines might
be levied for petty thefts.64
As with Native Americans, among certain African tribes theft is rare. One
anthropologist assigned the reason to be that the tribal members have few individual
possessions.65 However other delicts resembling theft might be treated with great
seriousness. Among the Pygmies living in the Ituri Forest of the former Congo, the men
hunted and still hunt as groups, with some acting as beaters to drive game in a certain
direction, and the others setting nets at agreed-upon locations. As Colin Turnbull
describes it, “In a small and tightly knit hunting band, survival can be achieved only by
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the closest cooperation and by an elaborate system of reciprocal obligations which
insures that everyone has some share of the day’s catch. Some days one gets more than
others, but nobody goes without.”66 In one incident that Turnbull recorded, a member of
the hunting party set up his nets in a place that garnered for him a comparative advantage
over the hunters. Brought to task, the hunter returned to camp and Returns to camp and
“ordered his wife to turn over the spoils.”67 Interestingly, the wrongdoer’s amenability to
accept this result might have been affected by his recognition that he could not, as a
practical matter defy it, recognizing that he was not in a position to break away from his
group, as “his band of four or five families was too small to make an efficient hunting
unit.”68 More generally, for theft among the Pygmies, the frustrated nocturnal theft of
food from a neighbor’s pot, punishment might include public whipping or shunning.69
All bodies of folk law contain proscriptions on conversion. For Tibetans,
pursuant to the Rules for Punishment of Tibetans of the Manchu Imperial Court, a theft of
domestic animals such as “dogs or pigs” could result in a fine, recoverable by the
wronged party, of five “animals”. Theft of other domestic animals, such as fowl, was
treated variously, with conversion of fowls punishable by a fine of a three-year-old cow.
Additionally, in each instance the stolen animal had to be returned.70
For theft of personalty (“gold, silver, sable, otter skin, hides, money, cloth, food,
etc.”) the malefactor was required to return property “of equal value”. In addition, fines
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would be imposed, keyed to the value of the stolen goods, e.g., three “nines” for the theft
of a two and one half year old cow; one “nine” for a sheep; and a three year-old cow for
the theft of an animal of lesser value than a sheep.71
Conversion or theft is prohibited of Muslims. As expressed in Sura 7:”Give . . .
the full in measures and weights; take from no man his chattels, and commit no disorder
on the earth after it has been made so good.”72 Muslims on pilgrimage are instructed to
kill no game in the lands through which thy journey. If such game is purposefully killed,
the person responsible shll compensate for it “in domestic animals of equal value (as
determined by two persons in the group), or feed the poor, or fast “that he may teaste the
ill consequences of his deed.”73 Although hunting will be prohibited for pilgimms,74 it is
lawful for them “to fish in the sea[.]”75
The same general approach is true of customary law. Among agricultural
community of the Konyak Nagas of India, conversion might be punished by fines,
although the stricter penalty of banishment might be reserved for chronic offenders.76
Folk stories too have long carried social norms from generation to generation.
Joel Chandler Harris, in his writing of the Uncle Remus stories, comments upon how
story and fable transport the listener from the common reality of known things into the
emotive state of feeling – wherein lay the enduring power of oral history and fable.77
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In one Indian folk tale even a thief’s theft of a mason’s services creates an
opportunity for some sanctimonious advice on victim responsibility. The story, entitled
The Burglar’s Gift, describes a mason who had once learned the lesson posed to The
beating suspended, the mason gathered himself to go home, only to have the burglar
those who do business for dishonest persons, but who found himself so in need of work
that he agreed to build a cellar for a man of suspicious character, indeed, “he was
reported to be a thief and burglar[.]” The mason complete the work and was invited to
the burglar’s home “to receive his humble reward[.]” Arriving the following morning,
the mason was distressed to see that he was the only guest, and his alarm only grew
greater as the burglar’s tone grew hostile and he began to beat the mason. "I shall return
to you every piece taken in wages," said the mason, "and the greatest reward for me is to
let me go." But the appeal fell on deaf ears and the host relished every lash he gave to the
mason. The latter invoked all the holy angels, the Holy Book and God to rid himself of
the present misfortune. At last the burglar seemed to have got tired and stopped.

The beating suspended, the mason gathered himself to go home, only to have the
burglar bid him to sit down. After a fine meal, the burglar presented the mason “a
malmal (turban) and a five rupee note by way of reward.” While confused at “this
paradoxical behaviour of the burglar[,]”, the mason accepted these gifts and asked again
to go. "I shall be most happy to bid you good-bye after I place a valuable and an
everlasting gift at your feet," said the burglar. The burglar continued, "You did not ask
Indeed, one of the queerest results of the old man’s manner of telling stories -- the charm of
which cannot be reproduced in cold type – was that all the animals, and all of the characters that
figured there, were taken out of the reality which we know, and transported bodily into that realm
of reality which we feel: the reality that lies far beyond the commonplace, everyday facts that
constitute not the least of our worries.
JOEL CHANDLER HARRIS, UNCLE REMUS RETURNS 62, 63 (1918).

me why I belaboured you so heartlessly?" To both of these declarations the mason did not
respond. "Look," said the burglar, "what I gave you as tokens of my appreciation will
last a short while and disappear. What I want to give you now will last for ever and is
sure to pass from one generation to another, and why I gave you a beating thus was to
imprint the lesson indelibly on your mind and body so that you never lose sight of the
great truth. The lesson I want you to learn is that you need not fear thieves and burglars
as long as your doors and windows are well bolted and hasped. On the basis of my
professional experience my advice to you is that you should always keep your windows
and doors properly hasped and bolted at night to be free of the fear of thieves. You will
please excuse me for the beating but the lesson had to be rubbed in thoroughly."

F. Negligence
Some scholars assert that the concept of “the reasonable man” was common to all
ancient cultures.78 The historical record seems to provide support for this. For example,
under ancient Mesopotamian law, for negligently cause personal injury, such as in a
brawl, the wrongdoer might be responsible for the person’s medical expenses, with
provision too for the time he was invalided,79 a provision quite similar to that contained
in the Code of the Covenant referenced above.80
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Further evidence in early Msopotamian law of a neighbor’s duty to another is
found in a rule that neighbors were bound by rules that served to deter letting one’s
unoccupied land elevate a risk of trespass or burglary to the neighboring property. The
Law of Lipit-Ishtar provided that upon notice from one neighbor that a second neighbor’s
unattended property provided access to the complainant’s property by potential robbers,
that should a robbery occur, the inattentive neighbor would be liable for any harm to the
complainant’s home or property.81
Rules for Punishment of Tibetans No. 26, reference earlier regarding it public
nuisance implications,82 also provides that witnesses (“those in sight”) of a “fir[e] caused
by carelessness” are “intitled to fine the guilty 5 animals.” If the carlelessly started fire
kills and individual, the fine is one “nine”. 83 Those carelessly handling firearms
“without justifiable causes”, and irrespective of injury, could be fined two “nines” for
Ch`inbu, one “nine” for Paibu, seven animals for centurions, five for lesser centurions,
and three for commoners and lesser elders.84
As to private nuisance, ancient Mesopotamia the codified customary law provided
specifically for redress should one’s irrigation waters overflow onto another’s property or
crops. Particularly harsh legal consequences might be visited upon the landowner who
failed to contain his irrigation canals, as flooding of the water might “result not only in
leaving crops and cattle dry and parched in one point, but also widespread floods in
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another part of the district.”85 In the simple case involving only damages grain,
replacement of a like amount might give sufficient remedy. But an unmistakably
message of severe consequences would be clear to those knowing that should the careless
farmer be unable to replace the grain, the neighbors might be permitted to sell his
property to sell him into slavery to achieve justice.86
Other Babylonian law imposed upon home dwellers a duty not to permit their
homes to be come private nuisances, at lease insofar as an unoccupied home might
become a hiding place for thieves or burglars. Neighbors in turn were bound by rules
that served to deter letting one’s unoccupied land elevate a risk of trespass or burglary to
the neighboring property. The Law of Lipit-Ishtar provided that upon notice from one
neighbor that a second neighbor’s unattended property provided access to the
complainant’s property by potential robbers, that should a robbery occur, the inattentive
neighbor would be liable for any harm to the complainant’s home or property.87
The logic of the “failure to cover a ditch” cases that are a mainstay of modern
casebooks88 is reflected in Code of the Covenant provisions providing that should one
leave a ditch uncovered and an ox or a donkey falls into it, he must pay the owner
(although he gets to keep the dead animal as his own!).89
Thus in order that we may receive such blessings as are identified in the maxims
such as “Keep no one from a running stream[;]” or “Let anyone who pleases take a light
from your fire[;]” or Give honest advice to a man in doubt[;]” Cicero writes, it follows
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that we must be willing to give likewise of the same in order to “contribute to the
common weal.”90
In Roman law, among the delicts of greatest importance were included damage to
property, real and personal, and the action injuriarum for personal physical harm to
others. The victim could bring an action for “profitable amends”, or money damages, or
“honorable amends”, which is to say, a formal and public apology. As had been
advanced in theory by Socrates, the latter remedy would most likely arise in setting in
which dignitary torts, such as defamation. Committed to the identification of the
delineation between “what is “just and what unjust”, the Institutes of Justinian and other
sources of Roman law reflected an endeavor to “give each man his due right”, and
comprises “precepts” to all Romans “to live justly, not to injure another and to render to
each his own.”91 Violation of a “personal action” not sounding in contract is in delict.92
In the law of ancient India there were rules for accidents caused by animal-drawn
vehicles. If the driver was unskilled, and the accident was “due to the driver’s
incompetence”, the owner of the vehicle would be fined “200” and “all the risers should
be fined 100.” If the driver was skilled, he would sustain the fine.

G.

Strict Liability

A commonly cited Law Code provision of Hamurabi treats the imposition of
strict liability when one’s animal injures another: “ If an ox gores an a ox and causes its
death, the owners of both oxen shall divide the value of the live ox and the carcass of the
90
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dead ox.” 93

Mosaic law too provides that “If an ox gore man or a woman that they die,

then the ox shall be surely stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten.”94 The proscription on
eating the animal, which is permitted when an ox gores another ox, has been attributed
described as a recognition that “the animal has killed a superior in the cosmic order,
namely a human being.”95
The Code of the Covenant addresses the issue somewhat more particularly. There
is no strict liability if the ox has not gored before, the penalty will be that the ox be
stoned, and its flesh uneaten. If, on the other hand, the ox “has been in the habit of
goring before”, and its owner is aware of this, if the ox kills a man or a woman the ox
should be stoned and its owner put to death.96 In a seeming endeavor to ameliorate such
harsh consequences, the Code also states that if instead the careless owner has assigned to
him a “ransom”, he may “pay whatever is imposed, to redeem his life.”97 Deaths of
children are treated with markedly less severity, as the payment of a ransom is the sole
prescribed punishment, and the goring of a slave presumptively even less severely – the
stoning of the ox and the payment of thirty shekels.98
Such forms of strict liability have persisted to this day. Using an example of
Salmond’s: “If my horse or ox escapes from my land to that of another man, I am
answerable for it without any proof of negligence.”99 While this application of strict
liability fortrespass may be based in a reasonable presumption of negligence upon such
occurrences, Salmond suggests that it’s truer origins may be in a vicarious liability
93
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liability placing upon the owner of property responsibility fo r injuries caused by such
property, such as a master’s responsibility for the actions of his slaves under Roman
law.100

I. Defamation and False Witness
In the speech Against Konon, Demosthenes gives the rationale for a vivil action
for slander in these words: For instance, there are cases of slander; these, they say, were
instituted in order that men who are abused should not be induced to hit one another.”101
In ancient Egypt, one tired for defamation could, as today, interpose truth as a
defense. Interestingly, if found liable, the libellant was not punished for this first
transgression. Instead, he or she was required to take an “oath of mutilation”,
covenanting that they would submit to amputation of their nose, ears, or each should they
engage in a further transgression.102

In the Koran, Sura 104 condemns “every backbiter,

defeamer.” It attributes to the amassing and storing of wealth as though it might be kept
by him forever. The defamer can more realistically forsee, Sura 104 suggests, “being
flung into the Crushing Fire.”103
Elsewhere the Koran condemns anyone defaming a “virtuous” woman unless the
author of the writing or utterance has four witnesses who support the account. Without
the witnesses, in which Sura 24 is seemingly more interested in than whether or not the
account is true, the responsible party will receive “four score stripes”, and is barred en
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perpetuity from giving testimony.104 Should a husband accuse his wife, the word of God
pays no heed to the testimony of witnesses and instead requires the husband to first
testify four times as to the truth of the accusation. When the husband repeats the
accusation the fifth time, if he is untruthful, “the malison of god be upon him[.]” If in his
fifth oath the husband speaks the truth, it will “call down the wrath of God” upon the
wife.105 Republishers of a defamation too would face a “sore” punishment.106
In an example of variations in the severity of the response to a delict turning on
the status of the victim, under ancient Indian law, defamation of a Brahmin by a lesser
caste might be punished corporally. For more prosaic libel and slander between social
equivalents, a fine would be the suitable punishment.107 This differentiation seems to be
the exception that test the rule of equal protection represented more generally throughout
ancient law.108
Pursuant to Mesopotamian law, should the slander pertain to the sexual honor of
another, the punishment might be shaming or flogging.109 This was true also of the
Torah.110 Locke would later describe such rules as those of “positive morality”, or “the

104

Sura 24, ¶ 4, THE KORAN
Sura 24, ¶ 9, THE KORAN
106
Sura 24, ¶ 11, THE KORAN
107
“If a man arrogantly makes false statements about someone’s learning, caste, country, occupation or
physical features, he should be fined 200. If a man calls someone `one-eyed’. `lame’, or some other similar
name, he should be fined at least I Karsapana, even if what he says is true.” THE LAW CODE OF MANU 143
(Patrick Olivelle, trans.)(Oxford 2004).
108
E.g. this tomb inscription of the Egyptian vizier Rekhmire (1479-1425 B.C.): I judged both [the
insignificant] and the influential; I rescued the weak man from the strong man; I deflected the fury of the
evil man and subdued the greedy man in his hour. . . I was not at all deaf to the indigent.” LAW IN ANCIENT
EGYPT supra note at 23, quoting T.G.H. JAMES, PHAROAH’S PEIPLE: SCENES FROM LIFE IN IMPERIAL
EGYPT 57 (1984).
109
ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAW, supra note at 81, discussing LH 127; MAL A. 17-19.
110
BIBLE, Deut. 22:13-19.
105

law of opinion or of reputation”. To Locke, such rules “consis[t] of the rules imposed by
society upon its members and enforced by public censure or disapprobation.”111

H. Deceit and False Report
Prohibitions upon making of false reports have been quite common throughout
legal systems or groupings or legal norms. The Koran provides that one committing an
“involuntary fault” (suggesting negligence or even blamelessness) or a crime but who
then “layeth [the blame] on the innocent” will be punished by being required to “bear the
guilt of calumny and of a manifest crime.”112
In Tibetan folk law, deceit regarding the ownership of animals was punishable
more severely than even the intentional killing of an animal. Within its rules regarding
lost animals, Rule 30 of the Manchu Imperial Court’s Rules for Punishment of Tibetans
provided for a fine of three “nines” for anyone “falsely claiming possession of such an
animal”, and one “nine” for anyone attempting to hide them.113 In other instances too the
punishment of deceit exceded that applicable to delicts involving of demonstrably or
arguably less economic dislocation. An individual falsely reporting a theft could be fined
three “nines”, with the fine distributable equally “between the elder in charge and the
person falsely charged.”114 Vigilence against deceit is manifest further in Rule 19,
pertaining to land transfers. For any new transferee discover “traces” of another’s
pasturage within three days of the vesting of the transferred interest, the new transferee
111
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must so report within three days. The transferor must thereupon “swear an oath” that
there exist no competing pasturage or third-party rights on the land.115
The Koran reflects God’s prohibition of deceit, as followers are enjoined to “be
not false in your own engagements, with your own knowledge.”116 Additionally, in the
circumstance of a death, the Koran details the testimony that must be sworn and the
accompanying safeguards against deceit. Two “just” men are to be chosen to swear as to
the circumstances of the death, and included inthat oath should be words to the effct that
“`We will not take a bribe though the party be of kin to us.” 117 Importantly, any oath of
the frist two men selected can be challenged “if it be made clear that both have been
guilty of falsehood[.]” Should this occur, two other men “nearest in blood” to the first
affiants will speak to the truth. The scripture notes with satisfaction that the prospect of a
challenge to the veracity of the first oaths will facilitate truth telling in the first instance:
“Thus it will be easier for men to bear a true witness, or fear lest after their oath another
oath be given.”118
Differing from but related to deceit, an act of “imposture” is interpreted to mean
taking undue advantage of another through the device of being an “imposter”. It is
logical that in defense of the faith adherents to the Koran would be sensitive to claims
that they themselves were imposters for proclaiming Muhammad’s words as those of
God. To this claim Sura 10 reinforces believers with the suggestion that “[I]f they charge
you with imposture, then SAY: My work for me, and your work for you. You are clear
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of that which I do, and I am clear of that which ye do.119 Elsewhere at Sura 22 believers
castigated as imposters are reminded that they can recall to their accusers that so many of
the great and accepted prophets, including Abraham, Noah and others, were so charged
and ultimately prevailed.120

J. Covetousness and Hoarding
Among certain Aleutian groups, cultural and economic norms developed to
protect limited resources and to deter non-cooperative appropriation or hoarding. The
indigenous tribes considered natural resources such as wildlife not the subject of private,
but rather of common ownership, a form of distributional necessity among subsistence
cultures.121 The harsh subsistence environment in which the Aleutians dwelt generated
rules adhering to strict efficiency norms. Among Aleutian groups, in the words of one
scholar, “life is hard and the margin of safety small, and unproductive members of
society cannot be supported[.]”122 It will be seen that to the characterization of
“unproductive” can be added can be added those whose conduct disrupts the allocative
efficiencies of the group. Thus, these norms penalize resource overreaching and the
arrogation of resources beyond one’s needs.
The Aleutians considered that treatment of land as commonly held, rather than
susceptible of private ownership, to be the most efficient manner of maximizing hunting
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resources. Further, although captured game and hunting instruments might be considered
private property, the community was “strongly hostile to the idea of anybody
accumulating too much property for himself, and thereby limiting the amount of property
that [could] be used by the community.”123 The ordinary remedy might be confiscation.
The influential anthropologist Hoebel identified one Aleutian grouping that sustained
keeping of an excess amount of goods could be considered a “capital crime.”124
Muslims are warned against the vice of covetousness in such language as is found
in Sura 113:”SAY: I betake me for refuge to the Lord of the DAYBREAK * * * against
the mischief of the envier when he envieth.”125 Further, “ Covet not the gifts by which
God hath raised some of you above others. The men shall have a portion according to
their deserts. The women shall have a portion according to their deserts. Of God,
therefore, ask of his gifts.”126
An Indian folk tale relates the travails that may follow one who covets the wife of
another. The story is titled “The Village Teacher”, and is told in this way:
Following the passing of a village’s old and respected teacher, there arrived a new
teacher “gifted with all those qualities which make us look wistfully on our departed
youth: energy, health, ambition, hope and vanity.” Women lived under severe
restrictions, and until recently, “their womenfolk, both Hindu and Muslim, lived in
purdah and would not leave the four walls of the house except with a veil hanging down
to their toes.” These restrictions were somewhat lessened for women in the city.
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The vanity of the young school teacher and his condiscenson together prompted
him to desire female companionship, and in particular a pretty and prosperous housewife.
The woman’s son attended the school teacher’s school, and at the closing of school he
would tell the boy: “Remember me to your mother". The mother, being both intelligent
and perceptive, deduced the teacher’s motives, and planned her response. One day the
boy told the teacher that his mother would like a word with the teacher at her home, and
further that her husband was expected to be away. Quite excited and dressed at his best,
he arrived at the woman’s house, where he was received warmly.

As he drank the proffered tea, a call came from the yard. It was the husband. The
wife began to tremble. "I am undone," she said, "if he discovers you here he will kill me
and not spare you either." "Have no fear," the teacher said, "he cannot be so harsh." "I
know better how ruthless he is,” she quickly corrected the increasingly anxious teacher,
“Would to God I were dead rather than be surprised in this compromising situation." She
began to beat her breast. "O quick, save my life." "Is there no other exit?" the teacher
asked. "No, none. He sees you here and I am killed. He is such a rough bear. Nothing
can save me unless ....” "Unless what?" "Unless you disguise yourself to escape his
suspicion." "Most willingly. I'll do anything for your sake" the teacher answered. He
was given a working woman’s cloak and scarf, and was placed before a basket of maize
and two millstones.

When the husband entered the home, he asked "What is that grinding sound
upstairs?" "It is that deaf woman turning out maize flour", she responded. As the
husband and his wife passed time in the kitchen garden and in the barn, the teacher wore

his hands to blisters pretending to be a working woman. "Revealing his awareness of the
ruse, the husband said, finally, “The fellow must be tired now and feeling bitter – you had
better dismiss him now. The lesson must have gone home to him." The housewife gave
the teacher his clothes and he left hurridly. The wife and her husband preserved the
secret, although after this time, the people in the village It was remarked by many people
the next day that the teacher had lost much of his spirit and liveliness. Some time later the
housewife sent a message to the teacher asking is he should like to visit again. This time
he simply responded: "Ask her if she has consumed the flour ground previously."

III.

CONCLUSION

Was H. G. Wells correct when in his OUTLINE OF HISTORY HE offered this vision
of the history of mankind’s law as “based upon a confused foundation of conventions,
arbitrary assumptions, and [constitutes] a very impracticable and antiquated system
indeed[.]” 127 Every observer must reach his or her own determination as to this. The
evidence that law, taken as a whole, demonstrates a tropism towards rationality and
progressive values is probably equipreponderant with evidence that it does not.
The legal subset of tort law is at once discrete and sprawling. The above
discussion of ancient and primitive law confirms what Gregory C. Keating wrote
regarding accident law alone, which is that tort law “curbs the freedom of prospective
injurers and enhances the security of potential victims. Risk impositions thus pit the
liberty of injurers against the security of victims and the law of accidents sets the terms
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on which these competing freedoms are reconciled. Its task is to find and fix terms that
are fair.” 128

What is the goal of the review contained in this article. It cannot be to amuse
ourselves with examples of how more efficient, transparent, humanitarian, or
behaviorially expert we have become as we compare modern Western law to its ancient
counterparts about the globe. To begin, no responsible legal anthropologist, or for that
matter no sociologist, should examine an incident of how another culture responded to a
social need and do so only after removing the subject from it s context, taking it, in a
sense, by forceps and removing it from its carefully constructed diorama. All of us have
mused at one point or another as to how incomprehensible certain things or affairs of our
modern lives would appear to visitors – of this world or another – who might a thousand
years from know encounter such things as stranded, a contextual relics. As is true today
was true also in ancient times: very, very few legal rules have no social bona fides; very
few rules are per se meritless.
Further, our legal exploration cannot be to congratulate ourselves that modern
Western civil code and common law legal systems have seemingly achieved consistent
levels of efficient and moral norms. For every arguably progressive initiative one state
may take, such as the implementation of social host liability for permitting an inebriated
guest to say good evening and drive away, there is a setback, such as the decisions of
courts to disallow public nuisance claims to be brought against the manufacturers of
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small concealable handguns and who drown counties surrounding large metropolitan
areas with these weapons well knowing that the guns will end up on the city streets.
The objective of such a review is to unveil and to examine examples of how other
cultures in distant times responded to a social imperative that has been constant for all of
man’s days: How may social groups, large and small, respond to the need to cabin
individual behavior to advance common well being. What mechanisms work best to
cabin or deter behavior that saps the well being of the larger group, and what
inducements are most likely to increase the incidence of behavior that conduces to the
public good.

W

hat has this inquiry revealed? What are the identifiable consistencies between the
discrete but representative cultures referenced? First and foremost, it is shown that a
standard of egalitarianism typically characterizes primitive groups deriving sustenance
from hunting or agriculture.129 Beyond this, perhaps the greatest consistency between
and among the legal norms and rules discussed is that of proscriptions of unconsented-to
taking. Whether the delict involved deprivation of another’s right to their own reputation
or the theft of goods, no human group, even in the earliest time, permitted one individual
to take from another simply because he was stronger, more cruel, faster or less principled,
i.e., simply because he could otherwise get away with it. The collective was better
served by deterring such behavior with such remedies as requiring the return of what was
owed, be it the return of the object or its equivalent, or the money, or in the case of a
dignitary harm, the rendering of an apology or its symbolic equivalent – suffering the
penalty that would accompany the false allegation had it been true.
129
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A similar congruence can be seen in the treatments of trespass to land or private
nuisance. If the harm to the property, or the interruption of the occupant’s right to
profitably exploit it, could be quantified in lost crops or otherwise, the amends would be
in kind. In turn public nuisance, which in early times could often be described in general
terms as behavior that detracted from good of the general community, the culprit might
first receive a sound thrashing in the hopes that it would deter continued deleterious
behavior. Lastly, it is seen that the remedies available under numerous law systems were
quite sophisticated in the rectificatory quality of permissible awards, and included not
only compensation in rough equivalence to the immediate severity of the harm suffered,
but also, when appropriate, costs of care and rehabilitation, as well as lost income.
Certain progressive or humanitarian progress is also evident. In several examples
discussed above the penalty for delicts ranging from manslaughter to battery to
kidnapping might corporal or even death. Or the transgression might result in vendetta,
or in a blood oath, binding the parties and their families to a violent continuation. With
the passage of time, though, there were introduced alternative means of remedying such
wrongs, to wit, the payment of money to the victim or to his or her family developments
that brought the rectificatory norms into greater alignment with modern standards of
corrective justice.
And so while this short article has provided, I hope, a diverting romp in the fact
and the lore of ancient normative treatment of civil wrongs, it is also a praesces of the
wheres, the whens, and the whos of the origins of our modern tort law. It can been seen
that the carbon dating of the roots of modern common law reach back further than the rise
of a lawyer class in pre-Empire England, and with regard to the modern civil code

treatments for extra-contractual harm, the origins antedate too even the Roman law that
underlay the Code Napoleon.

